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ABSTRACT
This study attempts to examine the relationship between shareholding 
patterns and banks’ financial performance, as defined from three different 
dimensions, namely, profit-based performance measured by return on equity 
(ROE), market-based performance measured by Tobin’s Q (TQ) and value-
based performance measured by economic value added (EVA). It included 
29 out of the 30 banks listed on the Dhaka Stock Exchange for the period 
2013–2017, providing a balanced panel with 145 observations. All data 
were collected from the annual reports of the respective banks. The random-
effects GLS regression model was employed to test the chosen hypotheses. 
This study found a conflicting result, i.e. there was a relationship between 
some, but not all of the patterns of shareholdings and financial performance 
of the listed banks in Bangladesh. For example, a significant relationship 
between foreign shareholding and banks’ financial performance, as 
measured by ROE, TQ and EVA-log, was found. Sponsor-directors and 
general public shareholdings were found to be significantly related to ROE 
and EVA-log, but insignificantly associated with TQ. However, institutional 
and government shareholdings were insignificantly related to the banks’ 
financial performance, regardless of the measures employed to assess it. 
This study contributes to the existing literature by exploring the relationship 
between shareholding patterns and banks’ financial performance, and may 
indicate the need for a restructuring of the existing shareholding patterns in 
the banking sector in Bangladesh in order to maximise performance. This 
study is distinctive compared to prior studies, as it examines the relationship 
between the shareholding patterns disclosed in the annual reports of the 
sampled banks and banks’ performance, as measured by EVA-log along 
with ROE and TQ, which have not been covered earlier.
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INTROduCTION
Corporate shareholding structure has been believed to play a pivotal role 
in the corporate finance literature (La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes & Shleifer, 
1999). It has a significant correlation with the Agency Theory (Khamis, Elali 
& Hamdan, 2015), which argues that an agency problem exists between 
concentrated ownership and dispersed ownership, between managerial 
ownership and non-managerial ownership, or between majority and minority 
shareholders, and that this negatively affects company performance. Berle 
and Means (1932) were the pioneers who elucidated the conflict or agency 
problem between different shareholding patterns. Shareholders with a high 
volume of equity shares typically have controlling power over corporate 
management, and they might exploit this power for personal benefit, 
ignoring the interests of the minority shareholders (Bebchuk, 1999). 
Costly measures are adopted (e.g. appointing independent non-executive 
directors to the board) to prevent this problem and to ensure the legitimate 
rights of minority shareholders, and this leads to an increase in monitoring 
costs for firms. However, “large shareholders are argued to monitor the 
management better than small shareholders as they internalize the larger 
part of the monitoring costs…….” (Laiho, 2011, p. 1), which results in 
lower monitoring costs. Therefore, there is a role of shareholding structure 
in influencing corporate performance (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).
Over recent decades, many researchers (e.g. Wruck, 1988; Mehran, 
1995; Gorton & Schmid, 1996; Firth, Fung & Rui, 2002; Welch, 2003; 
Hiraki, Hideaki, Ito, Kuroki & Masuda, 2003; Al-Sa’eed, 2018; Tam & 
Tan, 2007; Bargezar & Babu, 2008; Méndez & Gomez-Anson, 2005; Khan, 
Balachandran & Mather, 2007; Yarram, Balachandran & Sivalingam, 2007; 
Fazlzadeh, Hendi & Mahboubi, 2011; Mollah, Farooque & Karim, 2012; 
Aman & Hamdan, 2018; Mohammed, 2018; Chancharat & Chancharat, 
2019; El-Habashy, 2019; Ironkwe & Emefe, 2019; and Kao, Hodgkinson 
& Jaafar, 2019, amongst others) across developed and developing markets 
have  contributed to the literature of the corporate finance through rigorous 
studies on the relationship between corporate ownership structure and firm 
performance. However, the ownership structure and its influence on the 
banking sector in Bangladesh may be different from other developed and 
developing countries. This is because the corporate sector in Bangladesh 
consists mostly of small and medium-sized firms, of which 85% or 
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more  are established and controlled by single-family members or their 
heirs (Farooque, Zijl, Dunstan & Karim, 2007). The corporate owners of 
Bangladeshi firms exercise significant power over corporate management. 
This scenario is different from that in developed and developing countries 
where a diffused ownership structure is common. Furthermore, there 
are enormous variations between Bangladesh and other emerging, less-
developed or developed countries in terms of their social and economic 
systems and corporate management cultures (Manawaduge, 2012). Thus, 
studies into ownership structures and financial performance may not produce 
similar results for developed and less-developed countries, like Bangladesh. 
In this context, a small number of studies (e.g. Farooque et al., 2007; 
Farooque, Zijl, Dunstan & Karim, 2010; Muttakin & Ullah, 2012; Muttakin, 
Khan & Subramaniam, 2014; and Khan & Siddiqua, 2015, amongst others) 
have been conducted into the relationship between ownership structure 
and performance for Bangladeshi firms. These previous studies shared 
two common characteristics. Firstly, ownership structure was seen to be 
characterised by board ownership, managerial ownership, institutional 
ownership, concentrated or dispersed ownership and ownership held 
by block shareholders. For example, Farooque et al. (2010) revealed a 
significant positive relationship between ownership concentration and 
firms’ performance. Subsequently, Muttakin et al. (2014) found a positive 
relationship between family ownership and firms’ performance and 
also revealed that family firms performed better than their non-family 
counterparts did. In contrast, Muttakin and Ullah (2012) provided evidence 
of highly concentrated ownership having a negative effect on company 
performance. Similarly, Khan and Siddiqua (2015) documented family 
control having a negative impact on the value of financial firms, although 
family control was found to add value for newly established financial 
firms. In contrast, Farooque et al. (2007) had previously identified an 
insignificant relationship between concentrated ownership and Bangladeshi 
firm performance. However, the listed banks in Bangladesh have disclosed 
their shareholding patterns in their annual reports as sponsor-directors, 
institutional, general public, government and foreign ownership (e.g. Dhaka 
Bank, 2018; City Bank, 2018; and National Bank, 2018, amongst others). 
Hitherto, no attention has been paid to whether the current shareholding 
patterns disclosed in the annual reports of listed banks in Bangladesh affects 
the banks’ financial performance.
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Secondly, prior studies in Bangladesh have also commonly proxied 
firm performance by means of return on assets (ROA), return on equity 
(ROE), Tobin’s Q (TQ) and market share price (SP). The existing accounting 
literature reveals that a high percentage of ROE and ROA indicates better 
financial performance of firms. However, these are backward-looking and 
profit-based performance measures that focus on short-termism (Farooque et 
al., 2007; Hossain, Salam & Sen, 2017). In addition, the calculation of ROA 
and ROE can be manipulated within accounting principles and standards 
(Mollah et al., 2012). Equally, TQ and SP represent firm performance 
based on market perception (Ntim, 2009). The existing corporate finance 
literature suggests that a high ratio of TQ and high SP for firms indicate 
better performance. However, TQ can yield  misleading indication of a firm’s 
performance, particularly when a firm makes under-investments (Dybvig 
& Warachka, 2015). Likewise, SP may give an incorrect indication of firm 
performance, particularly if the stock market of a country is not efficient. 
Market efficiency is absent in the Dhaka Stock Market, as several 
reports document that its security prices do not fluctuate based on all the 
available relevant information, that individual dominance can be observed 
and that investors are not rational; consequently, the market share prices do 
not truly reflect firms’ performance. In sum, profit-based and market-based 
indicators do not accurately reflect a firm’s true financial performance or 
they fail to provide an indication of the true extent of the value created by 
a firm in an accounting year. Economic value added (EVA), an alternative 
performance indicator, is a value-based measure that assesses the true 
performance of firms and indicates the value generated by firms for their 
shareholders in a particular accounting period (Baker, Deo & Mukherjee, 
2009). However, it is still unknown whether the current shareholding 
patterns disclosed in the annual reports of the sampled banks in Bangladesh 
affect performance, as measured by EVA. 
Therefore, this study aims to examine the relationship between the 
different shareholding patterns disclosed in the annual reports of listed 
banks in Bangladesh and their financial performance, as measured by 
ROE, TQ and EVA. This study differs from previous work on ownership 
structure and performance in two ways. Firstly, it focuses on the actual 
shareholding patterns disclosed in the annual reports of listed banks in 
Bangladesh. Secondly, in order to allow comparison, it employs three 
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different proxies for performance, analysing the banks’ performance from 
three different perspectives and investigating the effect of the shareholding 
patterns on them. This study explores this relationship with the aim of 
adding diversity to the growing body of relevant work, primarily because 
the banking sector in Bangladesh is dominated, directed and controlled by 
founder family members (i.e. sponsor-directors). The findings may also 
indicate the desirability of restructuring the existing shareholding patterns 
in the banking sector in Bangladesh, in order to maximise performance.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews 
the existing literature on shareholding patterns and firm performance, 
while Section 3 is concerned with the methodology employed in this study. 
Empirical results and discussion are presented in Section 4, and finally, 
Section 5 draws conclusions.
LITERaTuRE REvIEw
This study reviews the relationship between shareholding patterns and 
financial performance, considering the proportion of different patterns of 
shareholding in isolation, rather than combined. As has been mentioned 
earlier, the annual reports of the listed banks in Bangladesh  tend to 
disclose five patterns of shareholding, specifically sponsor-directors, 
institutional, government, general public and foreign shareholding; it 
is, therefore, presumed that different patterns of shareholding  explain 
financial performance in different directions. This is because some patterns 
of shareholding play an entirely passive role, whereas others play an active 
role in monitoring and directing the activities of banks. Moreover, the 
motivations and abilities of various patterns of shareholding may influence 
in different ways the key decisions taken by firms; thus, firm performance 
may not all be affected in the same way (Hu, 2008). This is the reason why 
the study has reviewed the relationship between firm performance and the 
proportion of different patterns of shareholding in isolation, rather than 
combined.
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Sponsor-directors’ Shareholding and Banks’ financial 
Performance 
In the context of the business environment in Bangladesh, sponsor-
directors generally hold an extremely high number of equity shares, as 
they play a pioneering role in establishing a company. They act as non-
executive directors, but also control and influence the board, which may 
affect firm performance. According to the incentive alignment hypothesis, 
a high proportion of sponsor-directors’ shareholding may increase firm 
performance, as they can contribute positively to the board in making 
decisions by using inside information (Mollah et al., 2012). Conversely, the 
entrenchment hypothesis suggests that this type of shareholder diminishes 
firm performance, because they focus on maximising their remuneration; 
consequently, an agency problem is created between them and other types 
of shareholders (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
Empirical studies suggest contradictory results in terms of the 
relationship between sponsor-directors’ shareholding and firm performance. 
For example, using 153 randomly selected manufacturing firms in 
1979–1980, Mehran (1995) found that sponsors-directors’ shareholding 
is positively related to firms’ TQ and ROA. This result was borne out by 
Chu (2011) and Arouri, Hossain and Muttakin (2014), who found the same 
results for a sample of 58 banks in the GCC countries in 2010 and 786 public 
family firms in Taiwan during 2002–2007, respectively. In contrast, Imam 
and Malik (2007), Farooque et al. (2010) and Muttakin and Ullah (2012) 
found a negative relationship between sponsor-directors’ shareholding and 
the performance of Bangladeshi listed firms. However, using a sample of 
firms listed on the Botswana Stock Exchange for the period 2000–2007, 
Mollah et al. (2012) identified an insignificant relationship between sponsor-
directors’ shareholding and performance, as measured by ROA, ROE 
and TQ. Similarly, Tsetsekos and DeFusco (1990) and El Mehdi (2007) 
found sponsor-directors’ shareholding to have an insignificant effect on 
performance. Therefore, the following hypothesis is to be tested:
H1: There is no relationship between sponsor-directors’ shareholding and 
banks’ financial performance, as measured by ROE, TQ and EVA.
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Institutional Shareholding and Banks’ financial Performance 
Institutional shareholders are considered to be passive investors, 
as they exercise their influence on a firm’s management solely in terms 
of buying and selling shares, suggesting that their effect on company 
performance is likely to be insignificant. However, they can be effective in 
encouraging firm management to pursue risky and innovative projects, as 
they do not need to fear severe penalties or losing their jobs if the projects 
fail (Aghion, Reenen & Zingales, 2009). Furthermore, large institutional 
shareholders can force corporate management to ensure good corporate 
governance and legal safeguards, which may lead to better performance (El-
Habashy, 2018). Elyasiani and Jia (2010) found empirical evidence that long-
term institutional ownership caused better firm performance by decreasing 
information asymmetry and advancing the incentive-based component of 
executive compensation. Similarly, Arouri et al. (2014) revealed a positive 
effect on TQ and MTB in 58-listed banks of GCC countries; Khamis et al. 
(2015) found a positive relationship between institutional shareholding and 
ROA and TQ in listed firms in Bahrain; Amin and Hamdan (2018) identified 
a positive effect on ROA in 171 Saudi Arabian listed firms; Kao et al. (2019) 
found a positive relationship with ROA, ROE, TQ and MBVE in 10,151 
Taiwanese listed firms; and El-Habashy (2019) recorded a positive effect 
on ROA, ROE and TQ among listed firms in Egypt. 
In contrast, Al-Najjar (2015) provided evidence of a negative 
relationship between institutional ownership and performance in listed 
tourism firms in Jordan. Mohammed (2018) found mixed results in firms 
listed on the Jordanian Stock Exchange, for example, a negative relationship 
with ROE and TQ and an insignificant relationship with ROA. However, 
Ahmed (2010) and Mollah et al. (2012) established institutional ownership 
to have an insignificant effect on ROA, ROE and TQ in the firms listed on 
the Dhaka and Botswana Stock Exchanges, respectively. Therefore, the 
following hypothesis is to be tested:
H2: There is no relationship between institutional shareholding and banks’ 
financial performance, as measured by ROE, TQ and EVA.
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general Public Shareholding and Banks’ financial 
Performance
The contribution of general public ownership to the direct monitoring 
and controlling of corporate management is, in practice, almost absent. This 
is because they are known as minority shareholders and their stakes are 
diffused. Consequently, large or controlling shareholders are encouraged 
to expropriate firms’ wealth for their benefit, at the expense of minority 
shareholders. This situation leads to an agency problem, which negatively 
affects company performance. However, and according to Fama and 
Jensen (1983), public shareholding encourages firms, particularly complex 
organisations, to place emphasis on professional and skilled employees. This 
environment is predicted to enhance a firm’s profitability (Akhigbe, McNulty 
& Stevenson, 2017). Empirical studies by Leech and Leahy (1991) and 
Hoque, Islam and Ahmed (2013) provided evidence of a positive relationship 
between public ownership and ROE. In contrast, Dwivedi and Jain (2005) 
argued for the existence of an agency problem between controlling and 
minority shareholders, finding a negative relationship between public 
shareholding and firm performance. However, Ahmed (2010) and Mollah 
et al. (2012) identified public shareholding to have an insignificant effect on 
performance, as measured by ROE and TQ, in the banks and firms listed on 
the Dhaka and Botswana Stock Exchanges, respectively. Thus, the following 
hypothesis is to be tested:
H3: There is no relationship between general public shareholding and 
banks’ financial performance, as measured by ROE, TQ and EVA.
government Shareholding and Banks’ financial Performance 
In recent times, a debate about the efficacy of state ownership versus 
private ownership of firms has opened a new avenue for researchers. Recent 
corporate failures, particularly in the banking sector, have pushed states to 
rethink the need for the government ownership of firms and banks. It is 
argued that a government stake in a firm enhances monitoring by inviting 
significant media attention on firms. By contrast, government ownership 
in a firm may lead to suboptimal governance mechanisms, such as the 
government supporting an excess of workers (Boyko, Shleifer & Vishny, 
1995; Megginson, 2005). Conflicts between the government and other 
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shareholders may also lead to corporate inefficiency (Xu & Wang, 1999), 
so that performance may be affected negatively. 
Borisova, Salas and Zagorchev (2009) found empirically that overall 
government ownership ensured the quality of governance; however, federal 
government ownership was found to have a weaker negative relationship, 
while ownership by royal families and pension funds exhibited a weaker 
positive relationship with the quality of corporate governance. Similarly, 
Rafiei and Far (2014) revealed that state ownership positively affects  stock 
returns and dividend payouts in non-financial firms listed on the Tehran 
Stock Exchange. In contrast, Tusiime, Nkundabanyanga and Nkote (2011) 
suggested reducing government ownership in public sector entities in 
Uganda in order to ensure better performance. Similarly, other studies (e.g. 
Boardman & Vining, 1989; Xu & Wang, 1999) have identified a negative 
relationship between government ownership and firm performance. However, 
Arouri et al. (2014) provide evidence of an insignificant relationship between 
government shareholding and TQ and MTB in a dataset of 58 listed banks 
in GCC countries. Mollah et al. (2012) also documented an insignificant 
relationship between government shareholding and the ROA, ROE and TQ 
of firms listed on the Botswana Stock Exchange. Therefore, the following 
hypothesis is to be tested:
H4: There is no relationship between government shareholding and banks’ 
financial performance, as measured by ROE, TQ and EVA.
foreign Shareholding and Banks’ financial Performance
Foreign ownership of firms is becoming popular increasingly, as it 
has been thought to have a positive impact on firm performance. “This 
view derives from the presumption that foreign investment is a conduit 
for technology, capital, managerial skills, training techniques and various 
intangibles that promote efficiency” (Ananchotikul, 2006). That is, foreign 
corporate practices are assumed to be superior to those prevailing in the 
host economy, and foreign ownership may also be assumed to provide 
information about superior practices in such areas as information disclosure, 
internal checks and balances and accounting standards and encourage 
their adoption (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
[OECD], 2002); as a result, firm performance may improve. Sarkar and 
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Sarkar (2000) provided evidence of the positive effect of foreign ownership 
on firms’ value. Similarly, Dwivedi and Jain (2002) and Bentivogli and 
Mirenda (2017) documented that a higher proportion of foreign shareholding 
was related to the increased market value of Indian firms. Arouri et al. (2014) 
also identified foreign ownership to have a positive effect on the TQ and 
MTB of 58 listed banks in GCC countries, also in Kao et al. (2019) the 
same effect was found on the ROA, ROE, TQ and MBVE of Taiwanese 
listed firms.
However, foreign ownership does not, in fact, always act as a positive 
influence on corporate governance. Particularly, if foreign owners acquire 
a controlling stake in a home firm, they may then have the same incentive 
as other large insiders to expropriate wealth for their benefit, at the cost 
of minority shareholders; thus, a negative effect on firm performance is 
forecasted. In line with this premise, Mollah et al. (2012) established a 
negative relationship between foreign ownership and the market value of 
firms listed on the Botswana Stock Market. Recently, Khamis et al. (2015) 
also found foreign ownership to have a negative effect on the ROA and TQ 
of Bahraini listed firms, and Amin and Hamdan (2018) found a negative 
impact on the ROA of Saudi Arabian listed firms. However, Kumar (2002) 
provided evidence of an insignificant effect from foreign shareholding on 
Indian firm performance. Thus, the following hypothesis is to be tested:
H5: There is no relationship between foreign shareholding and banks’ 
financial performance, as measured by ROE, TQ and EVA.
daTa aNd METhOdOLOgy
Sample and data Sources
The sample consisted of 29 out of the 30 banks listed on the Dhaka 
Stock Exchange for the period 2013–2017. One bank, which had negative 
equity throughout the study period, was excluded from the sample. The 
combination of 29 banks and a five-year study period provided a balanced 
panel with 145 observations. This study employed panel data, as it provides 
advantages in estimations, such as “greater variability, less collinearity, 
higher speed of adjustment, larger sample size, considers the heterogeneity 
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of cross-sections, a higher degree of freedom, and better efficiency” (Din, 
Abu-bakar & Regupathi, 2017, p. 5). All data were collected from the annual 
reports of the respective banks.
variables 
Banks’ financial performance is the dependent variable, which is 
defined from three different dimensions, namely, profit-based performance 
measured by return on equity (ROE), market-based performance measured 
by Tobin’s Q (TQ) and value-based performance measured by economic 
value added (EVA). Shareholding patterns are the independent variables, 
which include five patterns of shareholdings, viz. sponsor-directors, 
institutional, general public, government and foreign shareholdings, all of 
which act as a separate explanatory variable.
Table 1: Variables, their Proxies and Measurements





Return on equity (ROE) Net income (after preferred stock, but 
before common stock dividends) of a 
bank divided by its total equity at the 
end of its financial year.
Tobin’s Q (TQ) The ratio of the market value of 
common shares plus total debts of a 
bank divided by its book value of total 
assets at the end of its financial year.
Economic value added (EVA-
log)
Log of the average cost of shareholders’ 
equity minus profit after tax, plus 
provision for general investments of 







Proportion of equity shares of a bank 
held by its sponsor-directors at the end 
of its financial year.
Institutional shareholding 
(INSSH)
Proportion of equity shares of a bank 
held by its institutional shareholders at 
the end of its financial year. 
General public shareholding 
(GPSH)
Proportion of equity shares of a bank 
held by its general public shareholders 
at the end of its financial year. 
Government shareholding 
(GVSH)
Proportion of equity shares of a bank 
held by the government of Bangladesh 
at the end of its financial year. 
Foreign shareholding (FGSH) Proportion of equity shares of a bank 
held by its foreign shareholders at the 
end of its financial year. 
146
MANAGEMENT & AccouNTiNG rEviEw, voluME 19 No. 1, APril 2020
Control 
variables:
Firm size (FMS-log) Log of total assets of a bank at the end 
of its financial year.
Debt-equity ratio (DER-log) Log of total debts to total equities of 
a bank at the end of its financial year.
Asset tangibility (ASTAN) Total fixed assets to total assets of a 
bank at the end of its financial year.
Firm age (FMY) Number of years listed on the Dhaka 
Stock Exchange.
Risk (RISK) Proportion of non-performing loans 
against gross loans and advances of 
a bank at the end of its financial year.
Revenue growth (REVG-log) Log of the percentage of the difference 
between the current year ’s total 
revenue and the previous year’s total 
revenue divided by the previous year’s 
total revenue of a bank at the end of its 
financial year.
Firm type (FTYPE) A binary number that takes the value of 
1 if the bank is a traditional commercial 
bank, 0 Islamic commercial bank.
As with prior studies, this study also included seven control variables 
– specifically log of firm size, asset tangibility, log of debt-equity ratio, firm 
age, risk, log of revenue growth and firm type – which are expected to have 
explanatory power for banks’ performance. All the variables are defined 
and operationalised in Table 1.
Model Specification
This study employed a panel data regression model to examine 
the relationship between shareholding patterns and banks’ financial 
performance. The Breusch and Pagan (1980) Lagrange Multiplier test (B-P 
LM) was conducted to choose between the pooled regression model and 
the alternatives to the panel data regression model (e.g. fixed-effects and 
random-effects models). The Hausman (1978) specification test was also 
performed to choose between the fixed-effects model and the random-effects 
model. This study examined the relationship between five shareholding 
patterns and banks’ financial performance, as measured by ROE, TQ and 
EVA-log,  by estimating following the three models.
ROEit = α0  + β1DSSHit + β2INSSHit + β3GPSHit + β4GVSHit + β5FGSHit 
+   β6FMS-logit + β7DER-logit + β8ASTANit + β9FMYit + β10RISKit + β11REVG-
logit + β12FTYPEit + uit + εit………………………………(1) 
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TQit = α0 + β1DSSHit + β2INSSHit + β3GPSHit + β4GVSHit + β5FGSHit + 
β6FMS-logit + β7DER-logit + β8ASTANit + β9FMYit + β10RISKit + β11REVG-
logit + β12FTYPEit + uit + εit………………………………(2) 
EVA-logit = α0 + β1DSSHit + β2INSSHit + β3GPSHit + β4GVSHit + 
β5FGSHit +   β6FMS-logit + β7DER-logit + β8ASTANit + β9FMYit + β10RISKit 
+ β11REVG-logit + β12FTYPEit + uit + εit………………………………(3) 
Where ROE = return on equity, TQ = Tobin’s Q, EVA-log = log of 
economic value added, α0 = the constant, t = time, β1…5 = regression coefficients 
of each independent variable, u = between-entity error term and ε = within-
entity error term. DSSH, INSSH, GPSH, GVSH and FGSH indicate the 
proportion of equity shares held by sponsor-directors, institutional, general 
public, government and foreign shareholders, respectively (see Table 1). 
FMS-log, DER-log, ASTAN, FMY, RISK, REVG-log and FTYPE denote 
log of firm size, log of debt-equity ratio, asset tangibility, firm age, risk, log 
of revenue growth and firm type, respectively (see Table 1).
The panel data regression model may, however, provide misleading 
estimations of the true model if related assumptions – such as multicollinearity, 
linearity and normality, heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation – are violated. 
The Shapiro-Wilk W test was performed to check data normality; variance 
inflation factors (VIF) and tolerance (TOL) statistics were estimated to 
confirm the presence of a multicollinearity problem between predictor 
variables. The presence of heteroscedasticity was checked by performing 
the Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test and the existence of autocorrelation 
problems was verified by performing the Wooldridge test and the Durbin-
Watson d test. 
RESuLTS aNd dISCuSSION
The analysis of results begins with the outcomes of the Shapiro-Wilk W 
test for checking the normality of the dataset. The test indicated that the 
data related to the EVA, FMS, DER and REVG variables were not normally 
distributed in their original form (Table 2). Thus, they were normalised by 
transforming into a log form.
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Table 2: Estimations of the Shapiro-wilk w test 





ROE 145 0.47597 Original Normal
TQ 145 0.1234 Original Normal
EVA-log 145 0.46114 Transformed Normal
DSSH 145 0.06514 Original Normal
INSSH 145 0.59619 Original Normal
GPSH 145 0.05354 Original Normal
GVSH 145 0.17802 Original Normal
FGSH 145 0.13380 Original Normal
FMS-log 145 0.57871 Transformed Normal
DER-log 145 0.09712 Transformed Normal
ASTAN 134 0.17654 Original Normal
FMY 145 0.05585 Original Normal
RISK 145 0.2479 Original Normal
REVG-log 145 0.05158 Transformed Normal
Notes: Original means data of the corresponding variables are normally distributed in their original form, while transformed 
means data of the corresponding variables are not normally distributed in their original form, and thus normalised by 
transforming them.
Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics for the continuous variables. 
It shows that the average for return on equity (ROE), with standard deviation, 
was 12.78% and 4.59, and the range of ROE was 2.52%–24.77% for the 
study period. These results suggest that the sampled banks earned a moderate 
level of profit by using their assets for the study period. The results, however, 
also suggest that the efficiency of the sampled banks’ management in using 
banks’ assets to generate returns varied significantly. The average Tobin’s Q 
(TQ) was 1.01, with a range of 0.9–1.13, for the study period. Theoretically, 
these results indicate that the average market perception towards the sampled 
banks was marginally good and their shares were slightly overvalued 
for the study period. However, the minimum value suggests that market 
perception towards some of the sampled banks was poor and their shares 
were undervalued. The average for log form of economic value added 
(EVA-log) was 7.80 (BDT1 2,591.45 million2), implying that the sampled 
banks added true value to the shareholders’ fund they invested. However, the 
standard deviation of 0.34 (BDT 909.82 million3) and the range of 7.06–8.44 
1  BDT denotes Bangladeshi Taka, the official currency of Bangladesh.
2  Figures without log form.
3  Figures without log form.
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(BDT 1,168.28–4,646.07 million4) suggest that the ability of the sampled 
banks to add true value to the shareholders’ investment varied significantly.
Table 3: descriptive Statistics 
variables No. of Observations Mean
Std. 
deviation Minimum Maximum
ROE (%) 145 12.78 4.59 2.52 24.77
TQ 145 1.01 0.05 0.9 1.13
EVA-log 145 7.80 0.34 7.06 8.44
DSSH (%) 145 37.35 15.80 6.73 67.25
INSSH (%) 145 15.47 9.22 0 34.90
GPSH (%) 145 40.60 17.49 6.6 83.45
GVSH (%) 145 4.30 17.35 0 90.19
FGSH (%) 145 1.61 4.81 0 25.7
FMS-log 145 11.97 0.36 11.12 12.61
DER-log 145 2.38 0.25 1.70 2.87
ASTAN 145 0.019 0.008 0.003 .039
FMY (Year) 145 13.91 6.49 5 31
RISK (%) 145 5.05 0.02 2.45 9.00
REVG-Log 145 2.28 1.15 -3.22 4.05
As shown in Table 3, the average proportion and standard deviation of 
sponsor-directors’ shareholding (DSSH) in the sampled banks was 37.35% 
and 15.08, respectively, with a range of 6.73%–67.25% for the study period. 
These findings suggest that ownership is concentrated in the banking sector 
in Bangladesh through sponsor-directors’ shareholding. This result supports 
previous studies in Bangladesh, for example, Farooque et al. (2007), Ahmed 
(2010) and Hossain (2019), who found concentrated ownership structures 
in banking companies in Bangladesh. The average shareholding of the 
general public (GPSH) in the sampled banks was 40.60% with a standard 
deviation of 17.49 for the study period. These results, therefore, suggest that 
the general public holds a higher proportion of shareholding, in total, than 
sponsor-directors, but, in person, every general public shareholder typically 
holds a lower proportion of equity shares. This kind of shareholding is 
labelled as diffused ownership pattern and has insignificant voting power 
and control over the professionals in bank management. The average 
proportion (standard deviation) of the government (GVSH), institutional 
(INSSH) and foreign shareholdings (FGSH) in the sampled banks were 
4.30% (17.35), 15.47% (9.22) and 1.61% (4.81), respectively, where the 
4 Figures without log form.
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minimum proportion of these shareholdings was 0% over the study period. 
In general, therefore, it seems that these shareholders did not make an 
extensive contribution to strategic decision-making and to controlling power 
over  management of a bank. These results further suggest that some of the 
sampled banks failed to persuade institutions, the government and foreigners 
to invest in their equity shares over the study period.
As for control variables, the average (standard deviation) size of the 
sampled banks, as proxied by the log form of total assets (FMS-log) of a 
sampled bank, was 11.97 (0.36) (BDT 168,737.305 and 9,976.59 million5, 
respectively), with a range of 11.12–12.61 (BDT 67,619–300,549.8 
million6), indicating that the banks included in the sample exhibited 
significant variation in size in terms of their assets. The average and standard 
deviation for log form of debt-equity ratio (DER-log) of the sampled banks 
was 2.38 and 0.25 (11.16% and 2.827, respectively), indicating that the 
sampled banks in Bangladesh were low geared during the study period. The 
average asset tangibility (ASTAN) was 0.019, with a standard deviation of 
0.008, implying that the sampled banks possessed an insignificant volume 
of long-term assets. A possible reason for banks to have a lower amount 
of long-term assets, compared to non-financial firms, might be that banks 
provide financial services (intangible products), rather than producing 
tangible products, for which they do not invest in long-term assets to protect 
the interests of investors (Hossain, 2019). The age range of the sampled 
banks (FMY) was 5–31 years, with an overall average age of 13.91 years 
and a standard deviation of 6.49. These results provide evidence that a 
small number of banks have listed on the stock market in recent years, 
while others were listed a long time ago. The average for log form of 
revenue growth (REVG-log) and standard deviation was 2.28 and 1.15 
(BDT 9,595.07 and 5,113.29 million8, respectively) with a range of -3.22 
to 4.05. Thus, it is credible to hypothesise that the growth of earning of the 
sampled banks differed significantly during the study period. Finally, the 
mean of risk (RISK) for the sampled banks, as proxied by the proportion 
of non-performing loans against gross loans and advances, during the study 
period was 5.05% with a minimum of 2.45% and a maximum of 9.0%. 
These results indicate that the overall risk level of the listed sampled banks 
5   Figures without log form. 
6   Figures without log form.
7   Figures without log form.
8   Figures without log form.
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in Bangladesh during the study period was high; however, the level of risk 
among the sampled banks varied significantly.
As can be seen from the results of Pearson’s correlation matrix 
presented in Table 4, the range of the correlation between the variables is 
0.002–0.725 (regardless of positive or negative sign), suggesting variables 
are linearly correlated. 
Table 4: Pearson’s Correlation Matrix




log aSTaN fMy RISK
REvg 
- log
ROE      1              
TQ 0.266*** 1             
EVA-
log 0.367*** 0.142*       1            
DSSH 0.185** 0.044 0.152*     1           
INSSH 0.102 0.07 -0.018 0.049       1          
GPSH 0.135* -0.105 0.115 -0.025 -0.059       1         
GVSH -0.284 0.345 -0.172 -0.596*** 0.123 -0.074        1        
FGSH 0.231** 0.104 0.053 0.196* -0.185* -0.03 -0.138      1       
FMS-
log 0.202** -0.24*** -0.29*** -0.066 -0.23*** 0.149* -0.244 0.22**      1      
DER-
log -0.118 0.139* -0.035 0.296*** -0.039 0.061 0.647*** 0.075 -0.042     1     
ASTAN -0.185** 0.078 -0.14* -0.008 -0.079 0.069 -0.645*** 0.114 0.089 -0.095     1    
FMY 0.109 -0.17** 0.041 -0.635*** -0.151* 0.077 -0.525** 0.097 0.502*** -0.332*** 0.21***    1   
RISK - 0.109 -0.078 -0.164* -0.202** -0.002 0.015 0.031 -0.008 0.007 -0.215** 0.104 0.139      1  
REVG-
log 0.208** 0.204** 0.115 0.011 -0.052 -0.017 0.006 0.091 0.006 0.113 0.016 -0.008 -0.086      1
Notes:  ***, ** and * indicate the p-value is statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
As presented in Table 5, the VIF statistics for all explanatory variables 
are seen to be far below the critical value of 10, and the TOL statistics are 
seen to be closer to the critical value of 1. These results provide evidence 
that there is no severe multicollinearity problem in the regression models. 
The results of the Breusch and Pagan (1980) Lagrange Multiplier test (B-P 
LM), as reported in Table 5, are seen to be significant in all cases, suggesting 
that the alternatives to the panel data regression model are preferred to 
the pooled regression model. As shown in Table 5, the estimations for the 
Hausman (1978) specification test, are found to be insignificant in all cases, 
suggesting that the random-effects model is preferred to the fixed-effects 
model in all panel data regression models (Greene, 2003).
As can be seen from Table 5, estimations for the Breusch-Pagan/Cook-
Weisberg tests are insignificant in case of models 1 and 3, but significant 
in case of model 2, suggesting that heteroscedasticity is probably not a 
problem in model 1 and 3, but it is a problem in model 2. Estimations of 
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the Wooldridge test are seen to be significant in all regression models, 
suggesting that a first-order autocorrelation problem is present in all panel 
data regression models. Also, estimations of the Durbin-Watson d test (D-W) 
are less than 1.5 in all cases, confirming the results of the Wooldridge test 
that there is evidence of a positive autocorrelation problem in the residuals 
from regression models. Therefore, the random-effects generalised least 
squares (GLS) with AR(1) disturbances in case of model 1 and 3 and cluster 
robust standard errors in case of model 2 methods were used to correct for 
the heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation problems (Hausman, 1978).
Table 5: Estimations for the Multicollinearity Test and the Relationship 





Estimations for the random-effects GLS regression 
analyses





DSSH 3.43 0.29 0.0698(1.89)* .0003(0.75) .0097(3.40)***
INSSH 1.79 0.56 -0.0022(-0.05) -.0008(-1.49) .0029(0.88)
GPSH 1.93 0.52 0.0310(1.74)* -.0002(-0.79) .0031(1.90)*
GVSH 1.53 0.65 -0.1255(-1.01) .0015(0.73) -.0136(-1.42)
FGSH 1.30 0.77 0.2454(3.84)*** .0012(1.66)* .0091(1.86)*
FMS-log 2.23 0.45 -2.2870(-1.72)* -.0081(-1.75)* -.4796(-4.69)***
DER-log 1.47 0.68 -3.0702(-1.24) .0276(1.00) -.0461(-0.24)
ASTAN 1.17 0.85 -21.6741(-0.45) 1.0561(0.95) -6.6688(-0.79)
FMY 3.31 0.30 0.5877(0.91) -.0044(-0.60) .04986(1.00)
RISK 1.35 0.74 -1.5638(-3.45)*** -.0023(-2.19)** -.1783(-2.15)**
REVG-Log 1.15 0.87 1.1593(2.23)** .0119(2.05)** .0802(2.00)**
FTYPE 1.51 0.66 0.2372(0.28) -.0022(-0.24) .1400(1.15)
_cons 46.6922*** 0.7661*** 2.5166**
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Wald  test (X2) 98.03*** 91.28*** 74.25***
R2 (within/between/overall) .4822/.5414/.4916 .5969/.4813/.4299 .3595/.3009/.3635
No. of observations 145 145 145
B-P LM test (X2) 15.88*** 32.20*** 39.48 ***
Hausman test (X2) 9.86 14.49 12.31
Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test (X2)   0.56 3.74** 0.02
Wooldridge test 29.69*** 34.99*** 25.89***
Durbin-Watson d test (D-W) 1.27 0.63 0.85
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Notes:
***, ** and * indicate the p-value is statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
Coefficients are outside the parentheses and z-statistics are within the parentheses.
The Wald test (X2) was performed to confirm the goodness-of-fit of models.
Heteroscedasticity problems in the panel-data models were checked by the Breusch-Pagan/ Cook-Weisberg test (X2).
Autocorrelation problems of the panel-data were checked by the Wooldridge test and Durbin-Watson d test.
The B-P LM test (X2) refers to the Breusch and Pagan (1980) Lagrange Multiplier test for choosing the random-effects 
model over the pooled OLS model.
The Hausman test (X2) refers to the Hausman specification test for selecting the appropriate model between fixed-effects 
and random-effects models.
Multicollinearity problems between the pair of independent variables were checked by tolerance statistics (TOL) and the 
variance inflated factor (VIF).
Table 5 shows that estimations for the Wald test (X2) are significant 
in all cases, indicating the goodness-of-fit of the panel data regression 
models. Estimations of R2 (within, between and overall) relative to model 
1 suggest that 48.22% of the variation in the ROE within each, 54.14% 
between each and 49.16% overall of the sampled banks for the study period 
was captured by the regression model. R2 in relation to model 2 suggest 
that shareholding patterns account for 59.69% and 48.13% TQ within and 
between, respectively, each of the sampled banks and 42.99% TQ overall 
of the sampled banks for the study period. Relative to model 3, estimations 
of R2 within, between and overall suggest that 35.95% of the variation in 
the EVA-log within each, 30.09% between each and 36.35% overall of 
the sampled banks for the study periods was captured by the respective 
regression model.
The regression coefficients for the relationship between FGSH and 
banks’ financial performance, as measured by ROE, TQ and EVA-log, are 
positive and statistically significant for the study period. These results, 
therefore, reject hypothesis five (H5). The results suggest that foreign 
shareholding enhances shareholders’ equity return and market value of the 
sampled banks and eventually adds true value to  shareholders’ investment in 
the sampled banks in Bangladesh. Despite foreign shareholding accounting 
for an average of only 1.61% of the total shareholding of the sampled 
banks, it was found to have a significant effect on banks’ performance. The 
results support those of Sarkar and Sarkar (2000), Dwivedi and Jain (2002), 
Arouri et al. (2014), Bentivogli and Mirenda (2017) and Kao et al. (2019).
The positive relationship between foreign shareholding and banks’ 
performance might be interpreted that foreign ownership in banking firms 
in Bangladesh provided better information and encouraged the adoption of 
superior practices in such areas as information disclosure, internal checks 
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and balances and accounting standards, and that this contributed to the 
enhanced performance of the banks. Another plausible explanation for this 
result is that foreign investment in the banks may have worked as a channel 
for bringing improved technology, sufficient capital, managerial skills, 
training techniques and various intangibles that promoted the efficiency of 
the banks’ management and led to better performance.
As for the relationship between GPSH and banks’ financial performance, 
as measured by ROE, TQ and EVA-log, this study finds mixed results. For 
example, GPSH is positively and statistically significantly related to ROE 
and EVA-log; however, it is insignificantly related to TQ. The results in 
relation to ROE and EVA-log reject hypothesis three (H3), but those related 
to TQ fail to reject the same hypothesis. Theoretically, these results suggest 
that a higher proportion of general public shareholding increases returns on 
shareholders’ equity and adds true value to  shareholders’ investment, but it 
fails to impress the market of the sampled banks in Bangladesh. The result 
pertaining to ROE is similar to Leech and Leahy (1991) and Hoque et al. 
(2013); however, it contrasts with Mollah et al. (2012) and Ahmed (2010). 
The result related to TQ supports those of Ahmed (2010) and Mollah et 
al. (2012), who found general public shareholding to have an insignificant 
effect on the TQ of the banks and firms listed on the Dhaka and Botswana 
Stock Exchanges, respectively. 
General public shareholding is known as a diffused form of ownership. 
Its insignificant relationship with market-based performance suggests that 
the general public are unable to contribute significantly to monitoring the 
banks’ management by involving themselves in strategic decision-making, 
which makes them powerless to control the professional managers, and, 
thus, they make no contribution to impressing market perception. 
As with GPSH to banks’ performance, the study also finds mixed 
results as for the relationship between DSSH and banks’ performance. 
For example, DSSH is positively and statistically significantly associated 
with ROE and EVA-log; however, there is no evidence of a significant 
relationship between DSSH and TQ. The results regarding ROE and 
EVA-log reject hypothesis one (H1), but those related to TQ fail to reject 
the same hypothesis. Theoretically, the results with regard to ROE and 
EVA-log support the incentive alignment hypothesis. According to the 
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hypothesis, it is presumed that sponsor-directors’ shareholders contributed 
positively to the board in making decisions by using inside information; 
consequently, their high proportion of shareholding in the listed sampled 
banks in Bangladesh increases returns on shareholders’ equity and also 
adds true value to  shareholders’ investment. Empirically, the result with 
respect to ROE is consistent with Mehran (1995), Chu (2011) and Arouri 
et al. (2014), who found a positive association between sponsor-directors’ 
shareholdings and accounting return-based performance. The result related 
to TQ is similar to Tsetsekos and DeFusco (1990), El Mehdi (2007) and 
Mollah et al. (2012).  
Turning now to the nexus of other shareholding patterns with banks’ 
performance, Table 5 shows that INSSH and GVSH are statistically 
insignificantly related to ROE, TQ and EVA-log for the study period, thus 
support hypotheses two and four (H2 and H4), respectively. In general, 
therefore, the results seem to show that institutional and government 
shareholdings do not give rise to improved profit-based, market-based and 
value-based financial performance in the sampled banks in Bangladesh. 
Despite these two shareholding patterns accounting for an average of 
19.77% of the total shareholdings of the sampled banks, they are found 
not to add value for the sampled banks. Empirically, the result related 
to the relationship of institutional shareholding with ROE and TQ are in 
line with those of Ahmed (2010) and Mollah et al. (2012), and the results 
regarding government shareholding reflect those of Mollah et al. (2012) 
and Arouri et al. (2014).
With regard to the control variables, a significant positive relationship 
was found between revenue growth (REVG-log) and banks’ performance, as 
measured by ROE, TQ and EVA-log. These results suggest that high growth 
of revenue increases returns on the stockholders’ equity, positively impresses 
the market of the sampled banks and adds true value to the shareholders’ 
investment over the study period. The statistically significant positive 
relationship between revenue growth and banks’ performance is consistent 
with expectation, theory and prior empirical evidence. For example, Klapper 
and Love (2004) documented that firms having higher revenue growth 
yielded a higher return on assets and led to the higher market value of the 
firms. Similarly, Shabbir and Padget (2005) revealed that faster-growing 
in revenue caused a higher return on assets of the firms. 
156
MANAGEMENT & AccouNTiNG rEviEw, voluME 19 No. 1, APril 2020
In contrast, firm size (FMS-log) and risk (RISK) are found to be 
negatively and statistically significantly related to banks’ performance, as 
measured by ROE, TQ and EVA-log. The results related to firm size are 
contrary to expectations as the results suggest that banks having greater 
assets experienced a reduction in their financial performance. Presumably, 
this is a cumulative effect and the reflection of the high volume of non-
performing loans in the banking sector in Bangladesh. This presumption is 
supported by the statistically significant negative relationship between risk, 
as proxied by non-performing loans and advances, and banks’ performance, 
which suggest that current high volume of non-performing loans and 
advances has a detrimental effect on return on shareholders’ equity, market 
perception and true shareholder value of the sampled banks in Bangladesh. 
This is because a high volume of non-performing loans and advances is a 
regular phenomenon for all state-owned banks and some private commercial 
and specialised banks. The state-owned and specialised banks are larger 
in size in terms of their total assets. According to the Bangladesh Bank 
(2018), the percentage of non-performing loans for state-owned commercial 
banks until the end of the financial year 2017–2018 was 28.2%, of which 
47% accounted for the five state-owned banks, the highest rate in the most 
recent decade.
On the other hand, debt-equity ratio (DER-log), firm age (FMY), 
asset tangibility (ASTAN) and firm type (FTYPE) were found to have an 
insignificant relationship with ROE, TQ and EVA-log. It can be seen from 
the descriptive statistics in Table 3 that the sampled banks were low geared, 
indicating that the level of core deposits of the sampled banks was relatively 
low for the study period. This is a disappointing finding for the sampled 
banks, as a relatively high gearing is common in the banking industry. It 
could conceivably be hypothesised that depositors found alternative sources 
of investment with higher returns than the rate of interest offered by banks, 
as suggested by Hoque et al. (2013). The results related to firm age imply 
that older banks were unable to enjoy the benefits of learning, that they 
were unable to avoid the liabilities of newness by investing in research and 
development, and that they failed to discover what they were good at. This 
result is consistent with Loderer and Waelchli (2009). The results concerning 
asset tangibility imply that the sampled banks failed to use their fixed assets 
to enhance their performance. This result validates that of Muritala (2012). 
The results in relation to firm type reveal that traditional commercial banks 
do not perform better than Islamic commercial banks and vice versa. 
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CONCLUSION
This study sought to examine the relationship between shareholding patterns 
and the financial performance of the banking sector in Bangladesh for the 
period 2013–2017. Five patterns of shareholdings (viz. sponsor-directors, 
institutional, general public, government and foreign shareholdings) were 
considered as the explanatory variables of interest in the study. In addition, 
seven control variables (viz. firm size, asset tangibility, debt-equity ratio, 
firm age, revenue growth, risk and firm type) were also included in the 
random-effects GLS regression models. As dependent variables, alternative 
financial performance measures – namely profit-based, market-based and 
value-based measures, as measured by ROE, TQ and EVA-log, respectively 
– were included in the developed regression models. 
This study has found a mixed result, i.e. there is a relationship 
between some, but not all of the patterns of shareholdings and financial 
performance of the listed banks in Bangladesh. For example, a significant 
positive relationship between foreign shareholding and banks’ financial 
performance was noticed, so that this can be considered to be a value-
adding pattern of shareholding. Sponsor-directors and general public 
shareholdings were found to add value in return on equity and to add true 
value to the shareholders’ investment, but that these fail to influence the 
market perception towards the sampled banks. However, the institutional 
and government shareholdings were found to have no effect on the banks’ 
financial performance, regardless of the measures  used to assess them. 
The findings of this study extend the empirical literature relating 
to the relationship between shareholding patterns and performance. The 
findings also have some implications for  policy makers and regulatory 
bodies in the banking sector in Bangladesh, as they suggest the need to 
rethink and to reform the current shareholding patterns of the banks, in order 
to enhance equity returns, to impress the market and to add true value to 
shareholders’ investment. This is because institutional and governmental 
shareholdings do not add value to shareholders’ investment, while foreign 
shareholding has been demonstrated by the study to be the most effective, 
value-enhancing pattern of shareholding. Also, general public and sponsor-
directors’ shareholdings are value adding patterns of shareholding in the 
sampled banks in Bangladesh.
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The study involves some limitations. For example, it excludes other 
governance variables, which may explain the financial performance of the 
sampled banks, such as managerial, family and non-family managerial 
patterns of shareholding. Therefore, the study reveals avenues for future 
research and further methodological improvement. Among these, it is 
worth mentioning an increase in the number of independent variables by 
including a broader range of governance parameters and a re-examination 
of the relationship with financial performance by including changes in 
accounting standards and additional dimensions of shareholding patterns.
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